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Abstract—Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS) attacks have 
become a major threat to the Internet. As a countermeasure 
against DDoS attacks, IP traceback schemes identify the network 
paths the attack traffic traverses. This paper presents a novel IP 
traceback scheme called Router Interface Marking (RIM). In 
RIM, a router probabilistically marks packets with a router 
interface’s identifier. After collecting the packets marked by each 
router in an attack path, a victim machine can use the 
information in the marked packets to trace back to the attack 
source. Different from most existing IP traceback schemes, RIM 
marks packets with the information of router interfaces rather 
than that of router IP addresses. This difference endows RIM 
with several advantageous features, including fast traceback 
speed, last-hop traceback capability, small computation 
overhead, low occurrence of false positives, and enhanced 
security. 
 
Index Terms—Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS) attacks, IP 
Traceback, Probabilistic Packet Marking. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
As the Internet’s scale and complexity continue to grow, the lack 
of security mechanisms during its early deployment years has led to 
serious problems today. In the past few years, many forms of 
Denial-of-Service (DoS) and malware attacks have been 
documented and brought to our attention through the news media. 
Among such attacks, Distributed DoS (DDoS) attacks are 
particularly menacing and very difficult to defend against. In a 
DDoS attack, an adversary gradually gains control over a large 
number of unsecured hosts, which are called zombies, as a prelude 
to the actual attack. The adversary then uses these zombies to 
launch a synchronized attack on a victim machine, overwhelming it 
with a deluge of packets. 
DDoS attacks are hard to defend against due to two major 
reasons. First, in a DDoS attack, the number of zombie machines 
involved in an attack can reach several thousands or even more. 
Mitigating the effects of an attack of such a scale is a daunting task. 
Second, the adversary often forges IP source addresses (i.e., “IP 
spoofing”) to hide the true origin of an attack. Although 
ingress/egress filtering [9] is being deployed in many networks to 
prevent IP spoofing, their effectiveness is limited without wide 
deployment. Moreover, ingress/egress filtering does not prevent 
subnet spoofing (the IP spoofing of a random address from the 
address space assigned to a zombie machine’s subnet). For these 
and other reasons, traceback schemes are necessary to locate the 
attack sources (i.e., zombies).   
To be practical and effective, an IP traceback scheme should 
possess several properties, including:   
•  Fast convergence: It should be able to execute traceback after 
collecting a small number of attack packets; 
•  Last-hop traceback: It should be able to trace back to an actual 
zombie rather than merely to its edge router; 
•  Minimal network and router overhead: It should incur little 
increase in communication overhead to the network and 
impose minimal computation and storage overhead on the 
routers; 
•  Scalability: It should scale to a large number of attackers while 
incurring small numbers of false positives and false negatives; 
•  Gradual deployment support: It should work in the presence 
of legacy routers that do not support traceback; and 
•  Marking field security: It should provide mechanism to thwart 
marking field forgery. 
Unfortunately, none of the existing IP traceback schemes [1, 2, 4, 5, 
6, 11, 12, 14, 15, 16] meets all the above requirements.   
In this paper, we propose a novel IP traceback scheme—Router 
Interface Marking ( RIM)—that meets the above requirements. 
Unlike most of the existing schemes that treat a router as the atomic 
unit for traceback, RIM recognizes a router interface as the atomic 
unit for traceback. A RIM-enabled router probabilistically marks 
each packet with the interface identifier ( IID) of one of the 
hardware input interfaces that processed the packet. A victim 
collects the packets marked by the RIM-enabled routers, and the 
information gathered from those packets is used to reconstruct their 
traversed paths. Our analysis and simulation results show that RIM 
has several advantageous features. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II 
presents an overview of related work. The technical details of RIM 
are described in Section III. In Section IV, we analyze RIM’s 
performance in terms of the numbers of false negatives and false 
positives. Simulation results are presented in Section V, and we 
conclude the paper in Section VI. 
II. RELATED RESEARCH 
IP traceback schemes can be roughly divided into four categories: 
ICMP traceback [2], probabilistic packet marking (PPM) [4, 5, 12, 
15, 16], packet logging [11, 14], and a hybrid of packet marking 
and packet logging [1, 6]. 
In ICMP traceback [2], an Internet router samples packets at a 
very low probability (e.g., 1/20,000) and sends an ICMP packet to 
the origin or the destination of a sampled packet. The ICMP packet 
contains the link information that a victim can collect to reconstruct 
an attack path. However, ICMP traceback has been criticized for 
inducing additional communication overhead to networks. 
Moreover, it needs a global key distribution infrastructure for 
authentication purposes, which is expensive to deploy and 
maintain. 
In PPM schemes [4, 5, 12, 15, 16], routers mark each packet at a  
 
pre-defined probability (typically 4%) with partial path information. 
Packets are marked by overloading infrequently used fields in the 
IP header, so that no additional communication overhead is induced. 
Typically the Identification and/or ToS (Type of Service) fields are 
used. By collecting the markings from a certain number of 
malicious packets, the victim can reconstruct the attack paths. 
Existing PPM schemes treat the router itself as the atomic unit of 
traceback. In contrast, RIM uses the router interface as the atomic 
unit of traceback. When a router is treated as the atomic unit of 
traceback, its identifier, which is an IP address, cannot be 
accommodated in the marking fields of a single packet. Therefore, 
multiple packets are required to encode marking information 
corresponding to a single router. The communication overhead 
needed to transmit the multiple packets and the computation cost 
required to decode the information contained in them are expensive. 
Because the identifier of a router interface is much shorter and can 
be held in the marking fields of a single packet, RIM can reduce the 
communication overhead and computation complexity. The 
identifier of a router interface can be used to identify the incoming 
link of a zombie’s edge router, while a router’s IP address can only 
represent the edge router itself. This property makes it possible to 
use RIM for last-hop traceback. 
In packet logging schemes [11, 14], routers store packet digests 
in the form of Bloom filters. By checking neighboring routers 
iteratively with information from attack packets, the attack path of a 
flow can be reconstructed. The major problem with this technique 
is that they induce significant computation and storage overhead to 
routers. For instance, a router supporting the mechanism of [11] on 
an OC-192 link needs to compute 660,000 hash functions per 
second and store 216MB of data per hour, assuming the size of 
each packet to be 1,500 bytes. Under the same assumption, the 
mechanism in [14] requires a router to compute 2.5 million hash 
operations per second and store 1.875GB of data per hour. 
The hybrid schemes [1, 6] utilize both packet marking and 
packet logging. Because both techniques are employed, the 
collection of packet markings can converge faster compared to pure 
PPM schemes, and the computation and storage overhead can be 
decreased compared to pure packet logging schemes. However, 
these hybrid schemes have their drawbacks, too. For example, the 
scheme proposed in [1] requires 34 bits in an IP packet for packet 
marking (which is still not practical [12]) and the mechanism in [6] 
consumes half of the overhead required by that in [14]. 
III. RIM: ROUTER INTERFACE MARKING 
A.  Assumptions and Overview 
We assume the following network environment. Every host, 
whether a client or a server, is connected to its local edge router. 
Edge routers are interconnected by core routers. A zombie that is 
sending attack traffic is called an attacker, and the server being 
attacked is called the victim. 
Recent studies showed that 95% of the observed routes had 
fewer than five observable daily changes [8]. Therefore, we make 
the reasonable assumption that every route from a client to a server 
has a stable path within the timeframe of interest. We will use the 
term  false negative to denote an attacker that has escaped 
identification, and use the term false positive to represent a 
legitimate client that has been incorrectly identified as an attacker.   
A RIM-enabled router should allocate an IID to each of its 
hardware interface, which is assigned in advance and unique to the 
router. The interface of the RIM-enabled router can mark an 
incoming packet with its IID and can execute XOR (exclusive OR) 
and increment operations on certain fields of the packet’s IP header. 
These functions are well within the capabilities of today’s routers, 
considering the facts that: 1) a typical commercial router maintains 
a shadow copy of a routing table at each interface [10] (which 
means that the different interfaces can process packets 
independently) and 2) a router routinely updates the TTL 
(Time-To-Live) field and recomputes the checksum field.   
B.  Packet Marking Employed by RIM 
 
Fig. 1. The upstream tree of the victim V. 
 
The conventional PPM schemes use IP addresses to identify a 
unique attack path, since an IP address is a globally unique 
identifier. RIM takes a fundamentally different approach. The basic 
principle of RIM is straightforward: in the upstream tree of a server, 
a string composed of locally-unique router input IIDs is a globally 
unique identifier of a path. “Locally-unique” means that an IID is 
unique within a router, but two interfaces of two different routers 
may have the same IID. Fig. 1 shows an example. In the figure, an 
upstream tree of server V is shown. The numbers on the links 
represent input IIDs. Suppose client C3’s path to server V is route 
C3-M-F-B-A, then the string of IIDs 18-47-34-21 (starting from C3) 
can be the unique identifier of C3 and its path. If C3 launches an 
attack on V, V can try to acquire the string and use it to trace back to 
the source of the attack. In practice, like the upstream interface of 
M, the FE (Fast Ethernet) and GE (Gigabit Ethernet) interfaces of a 
router can be connected to a switch, and thus to multiple 
hosts/routers through a LAN. This is the general scenario for most 
edge networks. To maintain the uniqueness of IIDs in such a case, 
we propose to map MAC addresses of connected devices to unique 
virtual IIDs. If a router interface hears frames coming from multiple 
MAC addresses, the router maps each address to a unique virtual 
IID and marks packets from different addresses with the respective 
virtual IIDs. With this approach, RIM is able to distinguish multiple 
hosts/routers that are connected to the same router interface, 
thereby supporting last-hop traceback. 
RIM uses 17 bits in the IP header for packet marking. 
Specifically it uses the 16-bit Identification field and one more 
reserved bit immediately following the Identification field. There 
are schemes that also use the 8-bit ToS field, thus using a total of 25 
bits [5]. In Subsection V.D, we investigate the relation between the 
number of bits used for packet marking and traceback performance. 
In RIM, we allocate six bits to an IID so that it can be any number 
from 0 to 63. Six bits are chosen because the vast majority of 
Internet routers have less than 2
6 = 64 working interfaces
1 [13]. 
Besides the requirement of local uniqueness, an IID should also be 
                                                        
1 In rare cases, a router may be connected to more than 64 devices. RIM 
addresses the problem by allowing a router to mark packets twice. For further 
details, please refer to our technical report [3].  
 
allocated randomly to minimize collisions that may result in false 
positives. More discussions on this issue are given in Section IV. 
RIM uses the following marking fields: five bits for Distance, six 
bits for XOR, and six bits for IID. The Distance field is used for 
recording hop-count related information. Its length is five bits 
because the current Internet has few routes that span more than 32 
hops [8].   
In RIM, a router probabilistically marks a given packet with a 
probability of p. The marking decision is made independently for 
each packet at each router. A router marks a packet by: (1) resetting 
the Distance field to zero and (2) copying the IID of the packet’s 
incoming interface to both the IID and the XOR fields. When a 
router does not mark a packet, which is with the probability of (1 – 
p), it does the follows: (1) increases the Distance field by one and 
(2) computes the XOR of the packet’s incoming IID and the value 
in the packet’s XOR field, and writes the result back to the XOR 
field.  
The information marked by an upstream router can be 
overwritten by downstream routers. When a victim receives a 
packet, its marking fields reveal three bits of information: (1) the 
hop count from the nearest upstream router that marked the packet 
to the victim; (2) the IID field value that was marked by that 
marking router; and (3) the XOR field value that was computed by 
taking the XOR over all the IIDs, starting from that marking router 
to V’s edge router. Hereafter, we say a victim’s received packet is 
marked by a specific router, if the router is the nearest upstream 
router to the victim that marks the packet. 
We illustrate our marking scheme with an example. Again, let us 
refer to C3’s path in Fig. 1. Suppose attacker C3 sends a packet to 
victim V and the packet is marked by M, i.e., none of F, B, and A 
marks the packet. So M will reset the Distance field to 0, and copy 
the packet’s incoming interface’s IID 18 (010010) to the XOR and 
IID fields. On the other hand, F, B, and A will increase the Distance 
field and update the XOR field. For example, F will increase the 
Distance field by one and compute the XOR of the packet’s 
incoming interface’s IID (47) and the packet’s XOR field value and 
write the result in the XOR field. When V receives the packet, it 
reveals the following information: the Distance field is 3, the XOR 
field value is 02 (=18⊕ 47⊕ 34⊕ 21), and the IID field is 18. 
Hence, V records the XOR and IID field values associated with hop 
count d = 3. We denote the three-tuple (d, IID, XOR) as a record. 
After a sufficient amount of time, V will eventually receive packets 
marked by other routers positioned along the attack path (such as F, 
B or A). Once all such packets are collected, V can organize the 
records got from these packets into a table that is sorted by the hop 
count. We call such a table a trace table. A trace table showing C3’s 
attack path is shown by the shaded records in Table 1.   
A trace table contains records from multiple packets. Hence, V 
needs to group the records based on the paths they belong to, 
beginning with hop 0. The grouping is to verify whether any two 
records of consecutive hop counts satisfy the equation   
 (1 ) (1 ) ( ) XOR d IID d XOR d +⊕ += , (1) 
where the number inside each ( ) represents the hop count 
associated with the record. If the above equation is satisfied, then 
the two rows are grouped together and associated with the same 
path. This process is repeated for all the rows in a sequential 
manner. In the example, the four shaded records can be grouped to 
the same path. This means that the corresponding IID string 
18-47-34-21, which represents C3’s attack path, can be recovered. 
The same technique can be used to differentiate multiple paths. 
Suppose that another attacker C4 sends packets to V via 
C4-P-H-C-A-V in addition to C3. The resulting trace table contains 
all records in Table 1. What V first notices is that there are two 
records with hop count of 0, which implies that there are at least 
two attack paths. The two attack paths can be separated by 
iteratively verifying Eq. (1) starting with  0 d =  and increasing d 
by one for each iteration. The verification is done for every row. 
The string of IID values of the records that satisfy (1) is the desired 
IID string. In Table 1, the four shaded records represent C3’s path 
18-47-34-21 while the non-shaded records represent C4’s path 
32-18-34-42. 
  Once an IID string is obtained, a victim can get its corresponding 
IP addresses in two ways. It can either query upstream routers 
iteratively (detailed in [11, 14]) or utilize a priori knowledge of an 
Internet map (discussed in [15, 16]).   
C.  Security of Marking Fields 
In this subsection, we discuss the problem of defending against 
marking field forgeries, which is a critical security problem shared 
by all PPM schemes. In such an attack, attackers arbitrarily write 
forged traceback information to the marking fields. Because each 
router marks packets probabilistically, some forged packet 
markings will not be overwritten. They could eventually arrive at 
the victim and disrupt path reconstruction. Although an attacker 
cannot forge the marking fields along its path to the victim because 
the Distance field is increased strictly by every non-marking router, 
the attacker may forge any marking fields with the Distance field 
longer than its hop count from the victim. To counter such an attack, 
an authentication scheme using time-released key chains is 
proposed in [15]. However, the scheme requires a global 
key-distribution infrastructure, which is costly to deploy and 
maintain. 
RIM can solve this problem with an alternative approach. The 
conventional packet marking schemes mark packets with different 
destinations in the same manner. Our approach requires that a 
router dynamically allocate different IIDs to its interfaces for 
different destination addresses in the marked packets. For example, 
suppose a router has two interfaces A and B. When it marks a 
packet, it can use H(pkt.dest) as A’s IID and use [(H(pkt.dest) + 
offset) mod 64] as B’s IID. Here H(pkt.dest) is a hash function of 
the packet’s destination address with a 6-bit output and offset is a 
number between 1 and 63. What hash function and which offset 
value to use are decided independently by each router. A more 
sophisticated version would be to vary the hash function with time 
so that it is even harder for malicious hosts to guess a valid IID.   
Findings from an Internet topology study [13] showed that the 
average router degree is 6.34. Hence, a 6-bit IID and a 6-bit XOR 
arbitrarily guessed by an adversary are valid with an average 
Table 1. A trace table containing the paths of C3 and C4. 
The marking 
router closest to 
V 
* 
Hop 
Count: 
d  
Interface 
Identifier: 
IID(d) 
XOR: XOR(d)  
A  0  21 [010101]
#  21 [010101] 
A  0  42 [101010]  42 [101010] 
B  1  34 [100010]  55 [110111] (⊕ 34=21) 
C  1  34 [100010]  08 [001000] (⊕ 34=42) 
F  2  47 [100111]  16 [010000] (⊕ 47=55) 
H  2  18 [010010]  26 [011010] (⊕ 18=08) 
M  3  18 [010010]  02 [000010] (⊕ 18=16) 
P  3  32 [100000]  58 [111010] (⊕ 32=26) 
* This column is for illustration purposes. The column’s information is not revealed 
by the packets collected. 
# The binary strings inside […] represent the binary equivalents. 
  
 
probability of 0.00155 (= 6.34/2
12). If a path includes m hops that 
are not part of any attack path, then an attempt to guess a valid IID 
string is successful with a probability of 0.00155
m, which is a very 
small value when m is large. Moreover, if the attacker is far away 
from the victim, the forged or guessed markings will be likely 
overwritten by intermediate routers.   
IV.  A NALYSIS OF FALSE NEGATIVES AND FALSE POSITIVES 
We first show that RIM incurs no false negatives if all of the 
attack packets have been collected. Suppose that the attacker is d 
hops away from the victim’s edge router and that the string 
IID(0), ..., IID(d – 1) represents the string of interfaces that 
processed the attack traffic. Also, suppose that XOR(i) denotes the 
XOR field of a packet marked by a router i (i = 0, ..., d – 1) hops 
away from the victim’s edge router. Then, a trace table should 
contain the following records: 
{0, IID(0), XOR(0)}, ..., {d – 1, IID(d – 1), XOR(d – 1)}, 
where ( ) (0) (1) ... ( ) XOR i IID IID IID i =⊕ ⊕ ⊕. Since 
() () ( 0 ) . . . () ()
(0) (1) ... ( 1) ( 1)
XOR i IID i IID IID i IID i
IID IID IID i XOR i
⊕=⊕ ⊕⊕
=⊕ ⊕ ⊕ − =−
  
is equivalent to Eq. (1), which is used to associate records to their 
corresponding paths, we see that IID(0), ..., IID(d – 1) must be the 
router IIDs along a single path.   
RIM incurs false positives because the IID and XOR fields of the 
packets coming from a legitimate client may coincide with those of 
the packets coming from a zombie. For example, suppose a 
legitimate client’s path expressed as an IID string is Pl0-Pl1-Pl2, it 
can become a false positive when substring Pl0-Pl1 is a substring of 
a zombie’s path and there is another zombie’s path Pz0-Pz1-Pz2, 
which satisfies: (1) Pz2 = Pl2 and (2) Pl0 ⊕ Pl1 = Pz0 ⊕ Pz1. The first 
condition leads to a collision of the IID fields at hop 2 and the 
second condition results in a collision of the XOR fields at hop 2. 
Generalizing the above argument, a false positive occurs when each 
hop of a legitimate client’s path (that is not shared by any attack 
paths) collides with a zombie’s attack path. Here, a collision means 
that two different packets traversing two different paths induce the 
same XOR and PID values at the considered hop in a trace table. It 
can be shown that allocating PIDs randomly minimizes the chance 
of collision. Hence, we assume that each router assigns IID values 
to its interfaces randomly from 0 to 63. If we assume that Na 
zombies are being traced back and assign the constant value Sb =2
12, 
then the probability that a link of a legitimate client’s path (that is 
not on any zombie’s path) collides with a zombie’s path is: 
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In (2), Pr can be understood as the expected ratio of the Sb 
combinations that is covered by Na independent random 12-bit 
numbers. If a legitimate client’s path has m links that are not on any 
zombie’s path, then its false positive probability is: 
 
m
r FP P P = . (4) 
V. SIMULATION RESULTS 
A.   The Topology Model for Simulation 
We adopt two real network topologies for our simulations. The 
first topology is chosen from the Skitter Internet map [13] on April 
21
st, 2003. We first chose a router with a degree of six as the 
victim’s edge router, and then randomly chose multiple distinct 
routes originating from it. The second topology is selected from the 
network topology data of Lumeta’s Internet Mapping Project [7]. 
The provided path data was collected on October 19
th, 2003. All 
paths start from a single router, which is the victim’s edge router in 
our simulation. This edge router has a degree of two. 
B.   The Performance of RIM   
An important performance indicator for IP traceback is the 
number of packets that need to be collected for reconstructing 
attack paths. Fig. 2 shows the 95
th percentiles for the number of 
packets required to reconstruct attack paths when marking 
probability p is set to 0.04. To better evaluate RIM’s effectiveness, 
we repeat the same experiments with FMS [12], AMS [15], and 
FIT [16]. AMS and FIT can be configured in more than one way. 
The curves of AMS and FIT in Fig. 2 represent the suggested 
configurations that require the minimal number of packets. Every 
point in the plots represents the 95
th percentile value out of 1000 
independent experiments. The result shows that the number of 
packets needed by RIM is the smallest among all PPM schemes. 
This is expected since RIM needs to collect only one marked 
packet from each router along an attack path, whereas other 
schemes need multiple marked packets.   
We are also concerned about the relation between the false 
positive ratio and the number of attackers. Figs. 3 and 4 show the 
false positive ratios versus the number of attackers on two maps. 
The false positive ratio is the number of legitimate clients that are 
mistakenly recognized as attackers by RIM divided by the number 
of legitimate clients. In each simulation, we fix the total number of 
clients to 5000 and vary the number of randomly chosen attackers 
from 1 to 4101 in increments of 10. All data shown in the figures 
are the average of three independent experiments. The results show 
that RIM incurs relatively low false positive ratios (which could be 
lowered even further by allocating more marking bits, as will be 
discussed in Subsection V.D). It is interesting to note that the two 
maps have quite different false positive ratios. The reason is that in 
the Skitter map, the victim’s edge router has a degree of six, while 
in the Lumeta’s map the degree is two. Because a larger degree 
means more path possibilities and less path collision probabilities, 
the Skitter map, compared to the Lumeta’s map, induces a larger 
value of m in Eq. (4) and a smaller PFP value. This result shows that 
making a victim network multihomed can decrease RIM’s false 
positive ratio. 
C. The Impact of Legacy Routers   
We evaluated RIM when a portion of the routers are legacy 
routers which do not support RIM
2. Figs. 5 and 6 show the 
simulation results on both maps. In the simulations, we assumed 
that the victim’s edge router is RIM-enabled and other 
RIM-enabled routers are uniformly randomly distributed in the 
network. We varied the percentage of RIM-enabled routers from 
20% to 100% in increments of 20%. The total number of clients 
was fixed at 2000, out of which the number of attackers was varied 
                                                        
2 It is noted that if a priori knowledge of Internet map is used for converting 
IID strings to IP addresses, there is no additional requirement for supporting 
gradual deployment. If we choose to query upstream routers, then we need 
RIM-enabled routers to support neighbor-discovery handshake protocol [3].  
 
from 1 to 1501 in increments of 10. Each point in the curves is the 
average of three independent experiments. The results show that 
RIM performs relatively well even when only a fraction of the 
routers are RIM-enabled. When the ratio of RIM-enabled routers to 
legacy routers is 60/40, the false positive ratios are 12% for both 
maps when there are 1500 attackers. 
D. The Impact of More Bits for Packet Marking   
We have assumed that RIM assigns 17 bits for packet marking. 
However, as mentioned in Section III, it is possible to allocate more 
bits. In this subsection, we assume that RIM uses two more bits 
(e.g., by using bits from the ToS field). We repeated previous 
simulations on the Lumeta’s map with one more bit allocated for 
the IID field and one more bit allocated for the XOR field. Fig. 7 
shows the simulation result. Compared to Fig. 4, the result shows a 
significant decrease of the false positive ratio. Based on this fact, 
we can conclude that the number of false positives can be reduced 
substantially by allocating a few more bits for packet marking. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
We presented a novel PPM scheme for IP traceback called RIM. 
The principal characteristic of RIM that distinguishes it from 
existing PPM schemes is that it treats a router’s interface—rather 
than the router itself—as the atomic unit for traceback. This 
characteristic endows RIM with several advantageous features, 
including: (1) RIM requires to collect a relatively small number of 
marked packets to execute traceback; (2) RIM supports last-hop 
traceback; (3) RIM incurs no false negatives (when all packets are 
collected) and a relatively small number of false positives even 
when faced with a large number of attackers; and (4) it is possible 
to incorporate into RIM new mechanisms for countering marking 
field forgeries. 
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Fig. 2. Number of packets required for path 
reconstruction (p = 4%). 
 
Fig. 3. False positive ratio in Skitter map. 
 
Fig. 4. False positive ratio in Lumeta’s map. 
 
Fig. 5: False positive ratio in Skitter map with partial 
deployment. 
 
 
Fig. 6: False positive ratio in Lumeta’s map with 
partial deployment. 
 
Fig. 7. False positive ratio in Lumeta’s map with two 
more marking bits. 